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Quantum information science breaks limitations of conventional information transfer, cryptogra-
phy and computation by using quantum superpositions or entanglement as resources for informa-
tion processing. Here, we report on the experimental realization of three-party quantum commu-
nication protocols using single three-level quantum system (qutrit) communication: secret shar-
ing, detectable Byzantine agreement, and communication complexity reduction for a three-valued
function. We have implemented these three schemes using the same optical fiber interferomet-
ric setup. Our realization is easily scalable without sacrificing detection efficiency or generating
extremely complex many-particle entangled states.
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Introduction
Many tasks in communications, computation, and cryptography can be enhanced beyond classical
limitations by using quantum resources. Such quantum technologies often rely on distributing strongly
correlated data that cannot be reproduced with classical theory i.e. it violates a Bell inequality[1]. To
violate a Bell inequality, the parties involved in the scheme must share an entangled quantum state on
which they perform suitable local measurements returning outcomes that can be locally processed and
communicated by classical means. Such entanglement-assisted schemes have been shown successful in
a wide variety of information processing tasks, including secret sharing for which additional security fea-
tures are enabled, detectable Byzantine Agreement for which a classically unsolvable task can be solved,
and reduction of communication complexity for which optimal classical techniques are outperformed.
Let us shortly introduce these three communication protocols.
Secret sharing is a cryptographic primitive that can conceptually be regarded as a generalization of
quantum key distribution[2, 3]. Secret sharing schemes have wide applications in secure multiparty
computation and management of keys in cryptography. In such schemes, a message (secret) is divided
in shares distributed to recipient parties in such a way that some number of parties must collaborate in
order to reconstruct the message. However, the security of classical secret sharing relies on limiting
assumptions of the computation power available to an adversary. Quantum cryptography introduces
the concept of unconditional security, and can improve security beyond classical constraints. Quantum
secret sharing protocols have been proposed with parties sharing a multipartite qubit entangled state[4, 5]
where their security is linked to Bell inequality violations.
A fundamental problem in fault-tolerant distributed computing is to achieve coordination between
computer processes in spite of some processes randomly failing due to e.g. crashing, transmission fail-
ure or distribution of incorrect information in the network. For example, such coordination applies to
the problem of synchronizing the clocks of individual processes in distributed networks, which is pivotal
in many technologies including data transfer networks and telecommunication networks. A method to
achieve synchronization is to use interactive consistency algorithms in which all nonfaulty processes
reach a mutual agreement about all the clocks[6]. Interactive consistency is achieved through solving
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the problem of Byzantine agreement, which can be solved only if less than one-third of the processes
are faulty[7]. However, for most applications, it is sufficient to consider a scenario called detectable
Byzantine agreement (DBA), where the processes either achieve mutual agreement or jointly exit the
protocol. Several quantum protocols based on multipartite entanglement have been proposed for achiev-
ing the DBA even in the presence of one-third or more faulty processes, thus breaking the classical
limitation[8, 9, 10].
In communication complexity problems (CCPs), separated parties performing local computations
exchange information in order to accomplish a globally defined task, which is impossible to solve single-
handedly. Here, we consider the situation in which one would like to maximize the probability of suc-
cessfully solving a task with a restricted amount of communication[11]. Such studies aim, for example,
at speeding-up a distributed computation by increasing the communication efficiency, or at optimizing
VLSI circuits and data structures[12]. Quantum protocols involving multipartite entangled states have
been shown to be superior to classical protocols for a number of CCPs[13, 14].
Quantum multiparty communication protocols that require only sequential communication of single
qubits and no shared multipartite entanglement have been proposed for secret sharing [15] and CCP [16],
and CCP using the quantum Zeno effect [17]. Very recently generalizations to d-level quantum system
(called a qudit) have been proposed. These protocols are multiparty quantum secret sharing[18] and a
quantum solution to the DBA, which can then be used to achieve clock synchronization in the presence
of an arbitrary number of faulty processes by efficient classical means of communications[19]. Beside
experimentally realizing these protocols, we propose and demonstrate a new single qudit protocol for a
multiparty CCP, that outperforms any classical counterpart.
Although the mentioned information processing tasks cover very different topics; cryptography, syn-
chronization, and communication complexity, we will show that the quantum schemes that distribute
these correlated data sets uphold strong similarities and the differences emerge from the classical pro-
cessing of the correlated data required to execute these protocols.
Our single qudit communication protocols hold several experimental advantages in scalability over
the corresponding entanglement-assisted schemes. While entanglement-assisted protocols typically re-
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quire the preparation of a high fidelity N -partite d-level entangled quantum state, the single qudit proto-
cols earn their name from requiring only the preparation of a single qudit independently of the number
of parties, N , involved in the protocol. Furthermore, in the likely case of parties using non-ideal de-
tectors with efficiencies η ∈ [0, 1], entanglement-assisted protocols require N detections and therefore
succeed with an exponentially decreasing probability, approximately ηN , while single qudit protocols
only require a single detection which succeeds with probability η, independently of N .
Communication protocols
In this report, we will present for the first time the experimental realization of quantum commu-
nication protocols, secret sharing, DBA and clock synchronization, and reduction of communication
complexity in a multipartite setting involving three parties, Alice, Bob and Charlie, communicating
three-level quantum states (qutrits). We will now very briefly present these protocols.
Secret Sharing
Alice (a.k.a. the distributor) prepares the initial qutrit state |ψ〉 = 1√
3
(|0〉+ |1〉+ |2〉) and applies
her action Ua0V a1 on the state |ψ〉 according to her input data (a0, a1), where a0 and a1 are two pseudo-
random independent numbers in the set {0, 1, 2}, and operators U and V are given by
U = |0〉〈0|+ e 2pii3 |1〉〈1|+ e− 2pii3 |2〉〈2| (1)
V = |0〉〈0|+ e 2pii3 |1〉〈1|+ e 2pii3 |2〉〈2|. (2)
Then she sends the qutrit to Bob, who according to his input data (b0, b1) acts on the qutrit with op-
erator U b0V b1 , and sends the state to Charlie who acts on the qutrit with operator U c0V c1 , where
(c0, c1) are his input data. Finally, Charlie performs a measurement on the qutrit in the Fourier basis{
1√
3
(1, 1, 1), 1√
3
(1, e
2pii
3 , e−
2pii
3 ), 1√
3
(1, e−
2pii
3 , e
2pii
3 )
}
, obtaining a trit outcome m (see Fig. 1). In random
order, the parties then announce their data a1, b1, c1, and if condition a1 + b1 + c1 = 0 mod 3 is ver-
ified, the round is treated as valid and equation a0 + b0 + c0 = m mod 3 produces the shared secret.
Otherwise if a1 +b1 +c1 6= 0 mod 3 the qutrit is not in an eigenstate of the measurement operator at the
time of measurement. Thus, the outcome m is random and the run is discarded. At this point all users
should publicly announce a0, b0 and c0 for a relevant number of runs and estimate the quantum trit error
rate (QTER) defined as QTER = number of incorrect outcomes/total number of outcomes. Finally, to
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reconstruct the shared secret at least two users are required to collaborate [18].
Secret sharing schemes can be subjected not only to eavesdropping attacks but also to attacks from
parties within the scheme. Examples are known in which such attacks can breach the security of secret
sharing schemes [20]. In the supplementary material we outline a scheme enforcing security that can, at
the cost of a lower efficiency, arbitrarily minimize the impact of such attacks. Furthermore, we mention
that the full security can be obtained from device independent implementations of entanglement based
quantum key distribution [21]. However, to our knowledge, there are no device-independent protocols
for secret sharing. In our proposed protocol we assume that the users have control over the devices.
Detectable Byzantine Agreement
In order to solve the DBA problem, the three processes (i.e. parties) need to share data in the form of
lists lk of numbers subject to specific correlations, and the distribution must be such that the list lk held
by process Pk is known only to Pk where k = 1, 2, 3. Quantum mechanics provides methods to generate
and securely distribute such data. In this case, Alice’s state preparation and each user’s action are the
same as in the previous protocol, except for b0 and c0 being bits instead of trits. The difference is in
the data processing part: if the measurement outcome is “0”, the parties reveal a1, b1, c1 and if condition
a1 + b1 + c1 = 0 mod 3 is satisfied, the round is treated as valid. It follows that they now hold one of
the data sets (a0, b0, c0) ∈ {(0, 0, 0), (1, 1, 1), (2, 1, 0), (2, 0, 1)} from which the DBA can be solved[19].
Communication Complexity Reduction
In the single qutrit protocol for reducing communication complexity, the distributor supplies Alice,
Bob and Charlie with two pseudo-random trits each, (a0, a1), (b0, b1) and (c0, c1). Each party’s pair can
be mapped into an integer by defining Sx ≡ 3x0 + x1 ∈ {0, ..., 8}, with x ∈ {a, b, c}. The distributor
promises the parties that Sa + Sb + Sc = 0 mod 3 and asks Charlie to guess the value of function
T = (Sa + Sb + Sc mod 9)/3 given that only two (qu)trits may be communicated in total. After
the |ψ〉 state preparation, Alice acts with U Sa3 (with U defined as in Eq. (1)) and sends the qutrit to
Bob, who applies U
Sb
3 before forwarding it to Charlie. Finally, after applying U
Sc
3 , Charlie performs a
measurement on the resulting state |ψfinal〉 = 1√3(|0〉+e
2pii
3
T |1〉+e− 2pii3 T |2〉). This state is an element of
the Fourier basis, so a measurement in this basis will output the correct value of function T with (ideally)
5
unit probability.
The CCP is to maximize the success probability of guessing T correctly, with the given communica-
tion restrictions. We have just seen that this success probability, save for experimental errors, is 100%
with our quantum protocol. However, it can be shown (see supplementary material) that the optimal
classical protocol achieves only a success probability of 7/9 ≈ 0.778, which is clearly inferior to that of
the quantum protocol.
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Figure 1: Schematic illustration for the three single qutrit three-party communication protocols. Alice
prepares state |ψ〉, Alice, Bob, and Charlie act with the operation U iV j sequentially on the received
state according to their input data (i, j), where (i, j) are (a0, a1) (b0, b1), and (c0, c1) for Alice, Bob, and
Charlie respectively. Finally, Charlie performs a measurement on the qutrit in the Fourier basis.
Experimental Realization
We have realized the three above-mentioned communication protocols with the same optical setup
reported in Fig. 2. The setup is based on a three-arm Mach-Zehnder-like interferometer built with opti-
cal fibers and a retro-reflective mirror (this configuration is a practical solution to the natural phase-drift
problem which affects every Mach-Zehnder interferometer, further complicated here by the fact that we
have three paths). The information transmitted between users is encoded in relative phase differences be-
tween the three states constituting the qutrit. The state preparation is carried out by sending light pulses
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from a 1550 nm diode laser (ID300 by ID Quantique) to the first 3x3 coupler of the Mach-Zehnder inter-
ferometer. The laser repetition rate is 100 kHz. The outcome after the second coupler is a superposition
of the three paths, so that the optical phase of each pulse of the qutrit can be individually modulated
with commercial phase modulators (COVEGA Mach-10 Lithium Niobate Modulators). The delays in
the interferometer are ∆LM = 68.40± 0.05 ns and ∆LL = 136.80± 0.05 ns. On the way to the mirror,
users passively let pass the qutrit through while after the reflection Charlie, Bob and Alice sequentially
act on the qutrit with a combination of operators U and V (see Eqs. (1) and (2)). After passing through
the three arms on their way back, the three pulses recombine at the first coupler and depending on their
relative phases, yield different interference counts at the single photon detectors (Princeton Lightwaves
PGA600). These gated detectors provide 20% quantum efficiency and approximately 10−5 dark count
probability. Importantly, in order to prevent possible eavesdropping attacks, each pulse is attenuated
to single photon level by a digital variable attenuator (OZ Optics DA-100) at Charlie’s station output.
We would like to emphasize that phase modulators are polarization sensitive, and for this reason they
include a horizontal polarizer at the output port. Therefore, controlling polarization throughout the setup
is crucial. We thus choose to use polarization maintaining fiber components for all three parties’ stations.
However, in order to make the configuration more realistic, links between users are standard single mode
fibers. Therefore, polarization controllers have been placed after these fiber links. Finally, the whole ex-
periment was controlled by an FPGA card that worked both as master clock and trigger source, for the
electronics driving laser and phase modulators, and for the single photon detectors. For future and practi-
cal implementations of these communication protocols, one needs to use a bright true or heralded single
photon source, integrated optics interferometer, and high quantum efficiency superconducting single
photon detectors.
Results
Each protocol setting was run 100000 times per second (i.e. 105 laser triggers) and the collected
data was used to calculate the QTER. Due to the substantial loss from the setup itself (mainly in the
phase modulators) and to the 20% detection efficiency, the final amount of runs with detection was 400
per setting. Our results for secret sharing and DBA experiments are reported in Tab. 1 and in Tab. 2
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Figure 2: Experimental setup used in this work. The components are: isolator (ISO), polarizers (POL),
circulator (CIR), two 3x3 fiber couplers (CPL), phase modulators (PM), fiber stretcher (STR), polariza-
tion controllers (PC), variable digital attenuator (ATT), retro-reflective mirror (MRR) and three single
photon avalanche detectors (D0, D1, D2). The three parties’ stations are polarization maintaining, while
the links connecting them are single mode fibers.
respectively. We can easily see that QTER for the secret sharing and DBA protocols are always below
10%. Our results are better than other results obtained with entanglement-based two-party quantum key
distribution protocols [23], and QTER clearly are below the 15.95% security threshold of qutrit based
quantum key distribution [22]. Therefore secure communication can be obtained with this configuration
[18]. Consistently, CCP experimental results, of which a sample of obtained data is reported in Tab. 3,
show success probabilities always above 90%, therefore proving the superiority of the quantum protocol
to any classical protocol (limited to 77.8% success probability).
The primary source of QTER is the so called “dark counts”. Our detectors’ average dark count prob-
abilities, measured with 106 runs, are 5.9 · 10−5, 2.8 · 10−5 and 20.5 · 10−5 per trigger for detectors 0, 1
and 2 respectively. Considering our measurements, these dark counts contribute up to half of the QTER.
Other important systematic contributions to the QTER are due to the phase drift affecting the interfer-
ometer. This phase drift causes two problems: it slightly changes the relative phases from the desired
8
Alice Bob Charlie
m
Counts QTER
a0 a1 b0 b1 c0 c1 D0 D1 D2 [%]
0 0 0 0 2 0 2 7 5 210 5.41
1 0 0 0 1 0 2 7 6 261 4.74
2 0 2 1 2 2 0 375 15 26 9.86
0 1 2 2 1 0 0 391 10 29 9.07
1 1 0 1 2 1 0 336 7 23 8.20
2 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 373 22 7.21
0 2 2 0 0 1 2 16 13 313 8.48
1 2 2 2 2 2 2 19 8 248 9.82
2 2 1 0 1 1 1 9 284 22 9.84
1 0 0 2 2 0 random 102 98 94 65.31
2 2 0 0 0 0 random 89 75 71 62.13
Table 1: Results for the Secret Sharing protocol.
settings and it forces a recalibration of the phases before each experiment. Both these contributions can
be quantified, by propagating phase errors in interference equations (see supplementary material), to be
approximately 1% each to QTERs.
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Alice Bob Charlie
m
Counts QTER
a0 a1 b0 b1 c0 c1 D0 D1 D2 [%]
0 0 1 0 1 0 2 16 11 337 7.42
1 0 0 0 0 0 1 16 320 19 9.86
2 0 1 0 0 0 0 347 13 20 8.68
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 363 13 20 8.33
1 1 1 1 0 1 2 11 17 333 7.76
2 1 0 1 1 1 0 309 9 13 6.65
0 2 1 1 0 0 1 7 277 19 8.58
1 2 0 2 1 2 2 9 18 274 8.97
2 2 1 2 0 2 0 300 7 26 9.91
Table 2: Results for the DBA protocol.
Alice Bob Charlie
T
Counts SP
Sa Sb Sc D0 D1 D2 [%]
0 1 8 0 350 7 28 90.91
0 2 1 1 8 284 23 92.53
1 5 0 2 14 14 255 90.11
1 6 2 0 337 5 29 90.84
2 7 3 1 13 268 16 90.24
2 0 4 2 10 2 204 94.44
3 2 4 0 302 8 22 90.96
3 1 8 1 8 358 22 92.27
4 8 3 2 10 13 269 92.12
4 5 0 0 332 12 21 90.96
5 6 1 1 21 370 19 90.24
5 4 6 2 14 18 297 90.27
6 2 1 0 298 3 28 90.30
6 8 7 1 6 297 18 92.52
7 3 5 2 6 13 232 92.43
7 0 2 0 264 12 12 91.67
8 2 2 1 7 385 31 90.40
8 8 8 2 13 11 229 90.51
Table 3: Results for the communication complexity reduction protocol.
Conclusion
We have experimentally realized three-party quantum communication protocols using single qutrit
communication: secret sharing, detectable Byzantine agreement, and communication complexity reduc-
tion for a three-valued function. We have implemented for the fist time these three protocols using the
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same optical fiber interferometric setup. Our novel protocols are based on single quantum system com-
munication rather than entanglement. Moreover, the number of detectors (detector noise) used in our
schemes is independent of the number of parties participating in the protocol. Our realization is easily
scalable without sacrificing detection efficiency or generating extremely complex many-particle entan-
gled states. These breakthrough and advances make multiparty communication tasks feasible. They
become technologically comparable to quantum key distribution, so far the only commercial application
of quantum information. Finally, our methods and techniques can be generalized to other communication
protocols. These protocols can also be easily adapted for other encodings and physical systems.
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1 Scheme enforcing security
In secret sharing schemes one may face attacks from cheating parties within the scheme. Since in a
three party scheme, it is not meaningful to have more than one cheater, let us assume that the cheating
party is Bob who attempts to access Alice’s secret. Since Bob is involved in the scheme, he may employ
a sophisticated strategy based on e.g. a quantum memory and an entangled ancilla state which can
allow him to pass the standard security check undetected. The success of any such strategy must in some
manner depend on Bob gaining information on some local data (a0, c0) of Alice and Charlie. However, as
the three parties announce their data in random order Bob cannot always succeed with his cheating, and
thus we can upper bound the probability of Bob successfully cheating in a single round by pcheat ≤ 2/3.
Here, we will outline a privacy amplification scheme that allows Alice and Charlie to arbitrarily minimize
Bob’s chances of inferring the secret.
The standard protocol is repeated many times and some rounds are used to estimate the QTER.
Assuming the QTER does not imply any security breach, this leaves L successful rounds. We let a(l)0 ,
b
(l)
0 , c
(l)
0 be the private data of Alice, Bob and Charlie respectively in the l’th such round, and we let m
(l)
be the measurement outcome of Charlie in the round. All parties then map their L trits into a single trit by
setting x′0 ≡
∑L
l=1 x
(l)
0 −m(l)δx,a mod 3 with x ∈ {a, b, c}. The new data now satisfies a′0 + b′0 + c′0 = 0
mod 3. Unless Bob successfully cheats in all L rounds, which happens with a probability p¯cheat = pLcheat,
he can infer no knowledge on the private data of Alice or Charlie. Thus, the number of rounds that
warrants the cheating success probability to be no higher than p¯cheat is L = dlog p¯cheat/ log pcheate i.e. at
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the cost of repeating the protocol several times, the cheating probability can be arbitrarily minimized. If
we consider an example of a known (G. P. He, Phys. Rev. Lett. 2007; 98: 028901-1.) such cheating attack
in a three party secret sharing protocol in which Bob was found to have cheating success probability per
round of pcheat = 1/3, and we require that p¯cheat ≤ 10−4, then we find that we need L = 9 rounds to
achieve this level of security.
2 Communication Complexity Reduction: classical bound
The quantum protocol for communication complexity reduction presented in our paper uses a single
qutrit and achieves the ideal success probability of 100%. We will now prove that our quantum protocol
is superior to any classical one.
To find the best classical protocol, we can without loss of generality consider only deterministic strate-
gies and disregards mixtures of such. Alice has to send the value of some three-valued function fA ∈
{1, e 2pii3 , e− 2pii3 } to Bob, and similarly, Bob has to send the value of some three-valued function fB to
Charlie, who outputs a final guess of T determined by a three-valued function fC . All such functions
take the form
f(x) = q0 + q1e
2pii
3
x + q2e
− 2pii
3
x (3)
with suitable choices of coefficients q0, q1, q2. Therefore, we write
fC = q
(C)
0 (c1, fA, fB) + q
(C)
1 (c1, fA, fB)e
2pii
3
c0 + q
(C)
2 (c1, fA, fB)e
− 2pii
3
c0 , (4)
where we have emphasized the dependence of the coefficients on the received data fA, fB from sub-
sequent parties. However, we must have q(C)0 = 0 since otherwise, the strategy is randomized. It is
straightforward to find that this implies that only one of the coefficients q(C)1 , q
(C)
2 can be non-zero, and
that its value must be either 1, e
2pii
3 or e−
2pii
3 . Therefore, we find that
fC = q
(A)
rA
q(B)rB q
(C)
rC
e
2pii
3
(rAa0+rBb0+rCc0) (5)
for some set rA, rB, rC subject to rA, rB, rC ∈ {1, 2}. Evidently, we should choose rA = rB = rC =
1 such that the contribution from a0, b0, c0 to the task function is correct. Then, since a1, b1, c1 are
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uniformly distributed and we are promised that a1 + b1 + c1 = 0 mod 3, there are nine different sets
(a1, b1, c1) of which only (0, 0, 0) sums to 0, only (2, 2, 2) sums to 6 and the remaining seven sets sum to
3. Therefore, let q(A)1 = q
(B)
1 = 1 and q
(C)
1 = e
2pii
3 which yields
fC = e
2pii
3
(a0+b0+c0+1). (6)
In conclusion, the optimal classical success probability is P (fC = T ) = 7/9 ≈ 0.778, which is clearly
inferior to the unitary one for the quantum protocol.
3 Encoding Settings
In Tables S1 and S2, we report encoding settings used by Alice, Bob and Charlie for the three experi-
ments. We write directly the angular phase shifts to be applied to the three state qutrits exchanged among
the users.
Secret sharing & DBA
Settings Alice Bob & Charlie
x0 x1 | 0 〉 | 1 〉 | 2 〉 | 0 〉 | 1 〉 | 2 〉
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 2pi
3
4pi
3
0 0 2pi
3
4pi
3
0 2 4pi
3
2pi
3
0 0 4pi
3
2pi
3
1 0 4pi
3
0 0 0 2pi
3
2pi
3
1 1 0 4pi
3
0 0 4pi
3
0
1 2 2pi
3
2pi
3
0 0 0 4pi
3
2 0 2pi
3
0 0 0 4pi
3
4pi
3
2 1 4pi
3
4pi
3
0 0 0 2pi
3
2 2 0 2pi
3
0 0 2pi
3
0
Table S1: Angular phase shifts for secret sharing and DBA experiments. Alice’s settings look different
compared to Bob’s and Charlie’s, but they are actually just the same settings multiplied by a global
phase. This is due to our particular setup configuration. All these settings belong to mutually unbiased
bases for three dimensions.
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Communication Complexity Reduction
Settings Alice Bob & Charlie
S | 0 〉 | 1 〉 | 2 〉 | 0 〉 | 1 〉 | 2 〉
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 14pi
9
16pi
9
0 0 2pi
9
4pi
9
2 10pi
9
14pi
9
0 0 4pi
9
8pi
9
3 2pi
3
4pi
3
0 0 2pi
3
4pi
3
4 2pi
9
10pi
9
0 0 8pi
9
16pi
9
5 16pi
9
8pi
9
0 0 10pi
9
2pi
9
6 4pi
3
2pi
3
0 0 4pi
3
2pi
3
7 8pi
9
4pi
9
0 0 14pi
9
10pi
9
8 4pi
9
2pi
9
0 0 16pi
9
14pi
9
Table S2: Angular phase shifts for the communication complexity reduction experiment. As in the
previous table, Alice’s settings are the same as Bob’s and Charlie’s save for a global phase.
4 Three-arms Interferometer Output Probabilities
We write here the output probabilities for a three-arms interferometer.
P (D0) =
1
9
{3 + 2 [cosφ2 + cosφ3 + cos(φ2 − φ3)]} (7)
P (D1) =
1
9
{
3 + 2
[
cos
(
φ2 − 2pi
3
)
+ cos
(
φ3 +
2pi
3
)
+ cos
(
φ2 − φ3 + 2pi
3
)]}
(8)
P (D2) =
1
9
{
3 + 2
[
cos
(
φ2 +
2pi
3
)
+ cos
(
φ3 − 2pi
3
)
+ cos
(
φ2 − φ3 − 2pi
3
)]}
, (9)
where φ2 and φ3 are phase differences relative to the reference arm.
17
